Thursday, January 13, 2011

Guns and Killing in 2011

"Guns don't kill people. People kill people." So the argument goes.

However, one has to accept the logical conclusion that people can't use guns to kill people if there were no guns. For people to kill people using guns, both guns and people have to be present! Now we can't eliminate the people side of the equation, but we can eliminate the guns side of the equation!

Using a similar argument one could say "Cigarettes don't kill people. People kill people." A dormant cigarette kills no one. It is when a person lights one that death may occur. Both cigarettes and people have to be present! Now we can't eliminate the people side of the equation, but we can eliminate the cigarette side of the equation.

Of course any instrument involved in the killing of a person involves not only the instrument, but a person. But it is the presence of the instrument that aggravates a person's ability to cause a death.

Many, if not most, of these "instruments involved in killing" such as planes, cars, swimming pools, etc. cannot reasonably be eliminated if people are to continue to exist contentedly in today's world. The incredibly easy availability of cigarettes and guns, however, can be controlled or eliminated and , arguably, not significantly affect a reasonably contented society.

Though cigarettes, planes, cars, and swimming pools, and the like are potential instruments of death, they are hardly ever used to deliberately kill. They are not instruments specifically designed to cause severe injury or death. They are not "weapons." Guns, on the other hand, are. Guns were invented specifically to inflict injury or death. They are "weapons!" Though they may be used for alternative activities such as target practice, etc. their invention was to inflict injury or death.

The second amendment of the Constitution of the United States gives citizens the "right to bear arms." No one can argue the fact that this amendment relates this "right" to the maintenance of a citizen militia. Whether the "militia" or the "arms" is the prime subject of this amendment remains unclear. Is it not reasonable to assume that, were "the right to bear arms" the major subject of this amendment, the founders would have not felt it necessary to include any reference to a militia therein? Agreeing that the founders were intelligent men, why wouldn't they just have said "The right of citizens to bear arms shall not be infringed" - and end it there?

The Constitution was designed to be amended. That is why the founders initiated the process of amendment in the first place. The "right to bear arms" is not an original article of the Constitution, but is a amendment! Remember, our founders when constructing our Constitution, decided it was "right" to count certain "citizens" as "3/5" of a person in determining the population of a district for representation in the House of Representatives. Yes, this provision was eventually eliminated by a post-Civil War amendment.

There is nothing "absolutely" sacred about our Constitution. There are times when "updating" and "modernizing" are necessary.


Realizing that the Founding Fathers were not absolutely correct in everything they composed (Consider the phrase regarding "savage Indians" in our Declaration of Independence), we should not feel constrained to change what clearly should be changed. A set of principles and laws written in 1787, surely demands occasional reconsideration 214 years later! Does anyone truly believe that Washington, Franklin, Jefferson, Adams, etc. would have included a "right to bear arms/militia" clause were they writing in 2011?




Wednesday, July 16, 2008

The Problem of Physician-Monopoly and Health Care

What about the ever-present concern regarding the unavailability of physicians to handle the increasing number of people seeking primary medical care. The time has come to realize that the acceptance of non-physician practitioners to fill this gap in care, is long overdue. The vast majority of clinical situations can easily be taken care of by auxiliary personnel such as physician assistants and nurse practitioners. As a matter of fact, the New York Times recently reviewed a TV documentary which describes how nurses in Mozambique are successfully performing Cesarean sections because of a severe shortage of physicians(July 15, 2008). When we call 911, it is not a physician who responds, but an emergency medical technician. Our lives are in their very capable hands.

Similarly, properly trained non-physician practitioners can provide much needed primary as well as specialty care, more efficiently and less expensively. Having worked and trained such personnel, I can testify to their competence. Physicians hold an unnecessary monopoly on health care; a monopoly that needs to be analyzed and subsequently, I would hope, eliminated.

Saturday, September 15, 2007

Jews, Israel and Dual Loyalty

It has been suggested by some that American Jews harbor competing loyalties to Israel and the United States. Jewish spokespeople have consistently, and possibly correctly, denied this concept. In doing so they always ask the question as to why other groups such as Italians or Irish, for example, are not similarly singled-out as having potential conflicting loyalties to their ethnic homelands.

To me the answer is rather clear. Whereas Italians and Irish have a longing for a homeland where their language is spoken, their foods are eaten, where they have memories of their ancestors, this does not apply to the American Jew and Israel.

The Jewish relationship to Israel is not one of an emigrant to his homeland. We American Jews are not emigrants from the Middle East with an immediate ancestral tie to Israel. Our forbears are from Europe, not Israel. Our foods are those of Europe, not Israel, our language is that of Europe, not Israel. Our customs are those of Europe, not Israel.

The relationship of American Jews to Israel is something very different and far deeper. It is not related to culture, to cuisine or language or homeland. Israel is a part of Judaism. Judaism and Israel are not easily separated. The land of Israel is central to Jewish festivals. Biblically Israel is synonymous with the Jews. Jerusalem and Israel are a constant presence in Jewish daily prayers; are in effect, an integral part of the Judaism. Judaism without Israel or Jerusalem is inconceivable. Whether Jews are in Israel or not in Israel, whether they are for Israel or against Israel politically, they can never deny the central position of Israel and Jerusalem in Jewish tradition, and even more importantly in Judaism. Italy or Ireland is not central to Catholicism.

The Jewish-Israel relationship, then, is unique. The question of dual loyalties is therefore not so easily answered.

Monday, August 6, 2007

Is Cardinal Lustiger a Jew?

The New York Times of August 6, 2007 includes the obituary of Jean-Marie Lustiger, former Cardinal Archbishop of Paris and Primate of France. Cardinal Lustiger was born to Polish Jews residing in Paris, and converted to Roman Catholicism as a child. His mother was murdered in Auschwitz.

Aaron Lustiger was born in Paris in 1926 and, in 1940, following the German occupation of France, was sent by his parents to live with a Catholic woman in Orleans. At age 13 he converted to Catholicism, adding Jean-Marie to his name. He always insisted and asserted that he remained a Jew despite his conversion. “I believe he saw himself as a Jewish Christian, like the first disciples,” said a close friend, the conductor Gilbert Levine.

“I was born Jewish, and so I remain, even if that is unacceptable for many,” said Lustiger.

In 1995, while the prelate was visiting Israel, Rabbi Yisroel Meir Lau, the Ashkenazic chief rabbi said Cardinal Lustiger “betrayed his people and his faith during the most difficult and darkest of periods.” The rabbi dismissed the assertion that the cardinal had remained a Jew. In response, the cardinal said: “To say that I am no longer a Jew is like denying my father and mother, my grandfathers and grandmothers. I am as Jewish as all the other members of my family who were butchered in Auschwitz or in the other camps.”

After the death of Pope John Paul II, there was speculation about Lustiger being a possible successor. “From your mouth to God’s ear” he responded in Yiddish, with his characteristic humor.

Again, the subject of “Who is a Jew” is raised. If there is, indeed, a Jewish ethnic identity, then an individual, once a member of this ethnic group, can never separate from it, no matter how he/she may try. If it is agreed that the concept of a Jewish People exists – this is genetic, not philosophical or religious. It cannot be otherwise.

So here are some clarifying concepts, as I see them:

1. The Jewish People – Individuals with a historic, genetic link to the original Israelites.
2. The Jewish Religion – Individuals who identify with Judaism, i.e. the religion founded by the ancient Israelites.
3. The Jewish Nation (or simply “Jews”) – Includes individuals in categories 1 and/or 2.
4. Israel – the present-day nation-state comprised of members of the Jewish Nation as well as other ethnic groups.

Rabbi Lau, the respected and revered Grand Rabbi, accepts the Holocaust as being God’s justifiable punishment of the Jewish people for believing in the Enlightenment, and founding Reform. I presume that he, then, considers Hitler an agent of God. This intolerant man with an overwhelming capacity to condemn and hate, and very little, if any, capacity to love and forgive, labels Lustiger as “a betrayer of his people.”

A change in philosophy or ideas is hardly a “betrayal.” “Betrayal” implies treason and dishonesty, with a determination to misrepresent or injure the “betrayed” party. If one leaves the Republican Party and becomes a Democrat – he has not betrayed the Republicans. If one decides to become a Reform Jew, rather than remain a Conservative Jew, he has not betrayed Conservative Judaism – merely changed his religious philosophy – as did Cardinal Lustiger.


All Jews, however they are defined, should exercise inclusiveness, not exclusiveness. Lets put an end to the concept of “two Jews, three synagogues!”

Monday, July 16, 2007

What do Polls Really Tell Us

When using polls as a guideline for action, it is imperative to be aware of some important issues in poll taking.

First – how is the question phrased? As example, consider the two questions below, both of which are attempting to evaluate the popularity of chocolate ice cream.

1. Do you like chocolate ice cream?
2. Do you prefer chocolate or vanilla ice cream?


Lets look at the results of the polls and let us assume they were carried out in an accurate and reproducible statistical manner.

Result of Question 1: 95% yes, 5% no.
Result of Question 2: Chocolate 50%, Vanilla 50%


Now lets change Question 2:

Do you prefer chocolate, vanilla, or some other flavor?

Result: Chocolate 50%, vanilla 20%, other flavor 30%


In this simple example it is easy to see how one may interpret the data differently depending on how a question is posed.

Now two more questions on a topic of national interest in our leadership:

1. Do you think President Bush is doing a good job? Yes or no?
2. Had Al Gore of John Kerry been elected instead of President Bush, do you believe that Gore or Kerry would have performed better than President Bush? Yes or No?


Results to Question 1. Yes 30%, No 70%
Results to Question 2. Yes 50%, No 50%


Interpretation of results to Question 1 appear quite clear-cut, but when the question is asked in another way, the results are open to a different interpretation. Take care before reaching conclusions. Consider in your own mind what may or may not have been actually polled!

Second issue – who is aware of all the facts needed for decision-making?

If a poll were taken among high school students regarding whether it is worthwhile to remain in school until graduation, it may show that there is a significant number of students who would rather leave school than stay. Have the students have answered with an awareness of all the facts regarding the pluses and minuses of such a decision?

A poll asking whether we should raise taxes, or leave Iraq, or invade Darfur, etc, asks for decisions to be made by people who most likely have very limited information. The vast majority of the polled public probably has not fully researched all the relative facts required to make an intelligent decision. Many of the answers are given based on “gut” feelings or because of media presentations. For example:

Presentation by Media 1: “2000 individuals lost their lives today.”
Presentation by Media 2: “2000 individuals were slaughtered today.”


In both instances 2,000 individuals are reported to have died, but how one regards the method of dying is quite different.

Individuals who are empowered to make decisions - parents, teachers, lawmakers, jurors, presidents, should make judgments not just on polls, but on the facts and all the facts, needed to make the proper decision – facts of which frequently only the decision-makers are fully aware.

Thursday, April 19, 2007

Analysis of Supreme Court Ruling on Late-Term Abortions

What are the essential facts discussed in the late-term abortion case recently decided by the Suypreme Court.

Before the Court was a Nebraska Act limiting late-term abortion procedures. The Act prohibits the employment of certain methods used in late-term abortions and individuals performing such methods are liable for criminal action. These prohibited procedures are specifically described below. The women on whom these methods are employed are under no criminal liability whatsoever.

The Nebraska case involves only those abortions in which a “living fetus is delivered vaginally.” (Called Dilatation and Extraction, or D-E) It does not restrict an abortion of an expired fetus. It also does not apply to abortions via hysterotomy or hysterectomy, nor those involving pharmacological agents, or intrauterine or intravaginal destruction and extraction. The act applies to both pre-viable and post-viable fetuses.

The Act defines this particular form of partial-birth abortion (D-E) as one in which the abortion is performed only after, either the entire fetal head is outside the mother’s body, or in case of breech or other such presentation, any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body. If the abortion does not involve the delivery of a live fetus to these anatomical landmarks, these prohibitions do not apply.

This Act states that a physician may not perform an “overt act” that would end the life of the partially delivered “living” fetus. In other words, this “overt act” must be separate from any act involved in the actual delivery and must occur only after the aforementioned anatomical landmarks have been reached. It also applies only if the fetus has been delivered to the landmarks intentionally; if delivered to these landmarks inadvertently, the act does not apply.

The Supreme Court agreed that there are differences of opinion regarding the relative safety of D-E vs. other forms of late-term abortions, and found that there is no firm statistical medical data confirming that one form may be more dangerous to the mother than another. The State, therefore, has the right to take moral issues into account in deciding among these procedures. The State of Nebraska has very explicitly defined a fetus delivered to very explicit anatomical landmarks as a fetus which has “started life” (my words) and therefore, any overt act to end its life approaches infanticide. The Court concludes that the State has a vested moral interest in the preservation of all life, in fact defining the partially delivered fetus as having essentially been “born.”

The Court holds very clearly that it’s ruling applies to this particular case and does not presume to evaluate the maternal indications for other cases. It accepts that the provision regarding “health of the mother” holds here in that there are other available procedures (see above), and that a significant number of physicians agree that prohibiting this one form of abortion would never impose significant health risks to the mother as the other procedures are available to her. Other physicians have disagreed, saying that D-E has “safety advantages” over the other forms of abortion. As previously mentioned, however, the Court found that there have been no proper statistical studies to document the validity of this argument.

The Court decided, based on previous lower court rulings, and previous stare decisis Court rulings that the Court has “given state and federal legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty.


Justice Ginsburg, writing for the minority dissenting, argued that there are clearly circumstances when D-E is the only safe technique. She also contests whether a government’s interest in the preservation of a viable fetal life applies here. She maintains that the act does not further that interest in that no fetus is saved from destruction, no matter what the method used. She then goes on to argue that since the act does not, in fact, preserve any fetal life, and limits a woman’s procedural choice, thereby potentially endangering her life and health, it is unconstitutional.

The majority, in its opening statements clearly re-affirmed it’s holding in Roe v. Wade and in Casey. Roe v. Wade has three main provisions 1) a woman has the right to choose to have an abortion before fetal viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the Sate. 2) The Sate has the power to restrict abortions after viability, if the law contains exceptions for pregnancies endangering the women’s life or health. 3) The State has legitimate interests from the pregnancy’s outset in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child. In this case, though all three are implicated, it is the third that requires the most extended discussion.

Analysis

It is difficult for me to conclude that one side is right and one side is wrong, I am not informed as to the medical data vis-à-vis the risks of the various late-term abortion procedures. This would be critical. If the Court was correct in stating that there are no statistics to show that D-E is considerably less risky than the permitted techniques, then there could be no medical reason to perform one versus the other. This, however, does not answer the question as to a woman’s right to request what her doctor considers the safest procedure, whatever it may be.

The essential question really boils down to how one feels about the status of a “living fetus” that has already been partially-born, i.e. the head has been delivered, or the body has been delivered up to the navel (in breech presentations.) The Court is basically stating that such “fetuses” are, in fact, either live births, or at least close enough to be considered a live birth.

Talmudic law has, in fact, prohibited termination of “fetal” life in cases where the 50% of the “fetus” has been delivered. Apparently Talmudic law, and now, American law has decided that a partial live birth is no longer a non-viable fetus and is, in fact, to be treated like a born infant, and that destroying such a fetus (or child) approaches infanticide.

The question really becomes a moral one more than anything else.

It is most important to realize, however, that the Court did not rule against late-term abortions, only against D-E - one of several techniques available to carry this procedure out.

Wednesday, April 11, 2007

Patient Rights vs. Doctor Rights

A patient's right to refuse treatment and a patient's right to demand treatment are two very separate concepts. It is akin to comparing a passenger's right to refuse to risk flying in a 'safe' plane with a pilot's right to refuse to risk flying an improperly prepared aircraft even if the passenger demands it.

There are two kinds of medically"unsafe procedures." - 1)the procedure which inherently is associated with a high mortality rate, and 2)the procedure associated with a low mortality rate, but becoming high risk without the available preoperative data required for a successful outcome.

The patient is free to seek other opinions, but has limited right to the performance of unsafe interventions. There is a difference between the two forms of so-called unsafe interventions. The patient may be justified in demanding a procedure that is highly risky, if this is the only available procedure, and can not be safely carried out under any circumstances. But no patient can demand that a physician transform a low-risk procedure into a high-risk procedure by prohibiting him from obtaining the necessary pre-operative information.

In the days prior to modern non-interventional forms of cardiac diagnosis, angiograms, using catheters inserted into the heart, were required for accurate diagnosis of a major cardiac abnormality. No surgeon could be persuaded to operate on a patient (except perhaps in a dire emergency) unless he were satisfied that all the required prereqeuisite knowledge was available in order to safely proceed